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Abstract
We examine stock market volatility attributed to industrial incidents involving publicly traded
US companies, with contributing factors identified as company violations and safety errors, equip-
ment failure, human error and vandalism. Incidents identified as safety violations elicited the highest
costs in terms of equity price reductions, but the volatility effects of these incidents tend to mitigate
within two weeks. Incidents caused by vandalism experience the sharpest volatility increases, but
reduce within two days. Volatility associated with incidents caused by equipment failure tends
to persist for almost four weeks. Injuries cost publicly traded companies $14 million each while
fatalities lead to equity market capitalisation reductions of between $465 and $720 million. These
results shed light on the equity market’s role as a driver for enhanced compliance with health and
safety regulation and with industry good practice.
Keywords: Chemical incidents; Stock markets; Crisis Management; GARCH; Risk management.
1. Introduction
There are many ways to create incentives for companies to minimise the risk as well as impact
of potential incidents that might harm their employees, stakeholders and the environment. The
most explicit method is to implement health and safety legislation which in turn imposes penalties
and/or lawsuits if breached. In addition, the insurance market is also likely to place a further cost
in the form of higher premium on firms with weaker safety standards. But these are not the only
disciplinary methods since the loss of shareholder value for the company that experiences a chemical
incident can in itself be a strong motivator to limit the probability as well as costs of such incidents.
In an efficient exchange, equity market prices reflect the present value of cash flows expected
Preprint submitted to Research in International Business & Finance August 4, 2020
by the equity investors of the company. Using event study methodology such as that pioneered by
Fama et al. [1969], it has been documented, that stock prices adjust quickly to new information as
investors reassess the market value of equity by evaluating the impact of new information on the
expected future cash flows and the risk-adjusted discount rate. An event such as a chemical incident
that results in property damage, injuries and/or the loss of life will cause investors to reassess the
company, its financial prospects, and its risk profile. Thus, this revaluation will be reflected in
changes in the market value of equity.
The risk-adjusted discount rate, which represents compensation for market risk, is unlikely to
be affected since a chemical incident should be expected to increase only firm-specific risk. There
is no reason, a priori, to expect an increase in systemic risk. On the other hand, an event like a
chemical incident is likely to impact future cash flows in a variety of ways. Changes in cash flows
could be brought about by actual cost of damages, potential legal penalties and possible lawsuits
by employees and other stakeholders directly affected by the incident. In addition, if there is a
temporary break or change in operations due to the physical damage caused by the incident, future
cash flows may very well be affected as the company may need to adapt its operations until the
damage is rectified. Finally, the company may be affected by reputational damage, loss of goodwill
or negative sentiment towards it or more widely to the sector in which it operates. The incident
may also result in increased regulation or monitoring which may lead to an increase in compliance
costs for the company and its competitors.
Of course, it is possible that investors have already captured some expected losses due to in-
cidents (taking the expected cost and probability of an incident into account) in their value as-
sessments, and the actual incident will not have a significant impact on the valuation unless the
incident is unusual from the type of incidents experienced within the sector. Moreover, insurance
against some losses can help mitigate the effects of the incident, though companies cannot insure
against increased future premiums, loss of future demand, increased wage bills or loss of reputation.
The net effect of these different factors on the market value of equity, of the incident firm, is an
empirical question and one that this paper addresses. This is completed by focusing on the chemical
industry and its potential to impact on the environment should an incident occur; thus, this research
draws knowledge gained due to workplace incidents as well as the environmental management field
in order to better understand variables that might explain the cross-sectional differences in stock
price reaction.
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The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the relevant literature and
the motivation for the study. Section 3 presents the data used in the analysis and details of its
compilation. Section 4 explains the methodology used to analyse equity market response to chemical
incidents. Section 5 presents the results of the analysis while section 6 concludes.
2. Background and Literature
In the area of environmental management, research has focused how the stock market reacts to a
company’s record on environmental management which is measured by self-assessments completed
by firms (Jacobs et al. [2010]), by awards by third parties (Klassen and McLaughlin [1996]; Jacobs
et al. [2010]), by ratings performed by third parties (Gupta and Goldar [2005]) and by environmental
crises (Klassen and McLaughlin [1996]). For example, Klassen and McLaughlin [1996] find that
strong environmental management (proxied by awards) results in positive stock price reaction while
weak environmental management (proxied by environmental incidents) elicits a negative stock price
reaction reflecting a loss, on average, of $390 million or $0.70 per share. Moreover, the reaction is
stronger for companies that are first time award winners suggesting that the market sees the initial
external validation as a more informative signal of information regarding a company’s environmental
programme. Jacobs et al. [2010] document that equity markets respond positively to philanthropic
gifts for environmental causes, but react negatively to pledges or realisations of voluntary emission
reductions which are perceived as expensive as well as potentially growth reducing (Smith and Sims
[1985]). Gupta and Goldar [2005] evaluate the market reaction to environmental ratings in India
(provided by India’s leading environmental NGO) and document that capital markets in developing
countries also react as expected - there is a negative stock price reaction for companies that have
lower than expected ratings.
Research in the area of stock market reaction to workplace incidents has also focused on partic-
ular events (for example, the Deepwater Horizon explosion in 2010 or the Buncefield oil depot fire
in 2006) or can be broader in considering incidents over a set time period. Capelle-Blancard and
Laguna [2010] and Sabet et al. [2012] include the first, single incident, type. For the most part, the
results indicate that the market is able to distinguish between companies which play a greater role
in the incident, or are more directly involved in the chain of events, as the share price in these com-
panies show a stronger negative reaction to the incident. Related event studies have been carried
out documenting similar results for the Exxon-Valdex oil spill of 1989 and the Bhopal explosion of
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1984 (Salinger [1992]; Herbst et al. [1996]). For one single incident, Lee and Garza-gomez [2012]
investigate the Deepwater Horizon Oil spill of 2010 to find that stock market valuations indicated
a $104.8 billion loss, but this recovered to a loss of $68.2 billion six months later when the well
was permanently sealed. This was found to significantly outweigh the cost that BP allocated in its
annual report of $53.5 billion. In such, one can see clearly the substantial costs that are incurred
from incidents of such a severe nature.
Studies taking a broader view and investigating a portfolio of industrial incidents, rather than a
single event, tend to show that, on average, the market responds negatively, to such. We specifically
develop on similar work that investigate issues stock market performance in the aftermath of shocks
to the chemical sector (Brown et al. [2015]), terrorist attacks (Corbet et al. [2018]) and broad
financial crisis issues (Corbet [2016]; Meegan et al. [2018]; Corbet et al. [2017]). Broder and
Morrall [1991] models the expected losses from faulty products or workplace incidents caused by
faulty products and predicts losses resulting from decreased product demand, as well as an increased
wage bill in addition to increased costs due to property damage and down-time. She documents
that losses are greater for more serious incidents (as measured by a greater number of deaths per
incident) as well as for products or workplaces that had lower perceived risk prior to the incident.
This confirms earlier research by Viscusi et al. [1988] highlighting Bayesian decision-making in face
of greater information about risk. Luo and Zhang [2019] specifically investigated economic policy
uncertainty and stock price crash risk while Poshakwale et al. [2019] examined the relationship
and the cross-sectional asset pricing implications of risk arising from the innovations in the short
and the long-term implied market volatility on excess returns of the FTSE100 and the FTSE250
indices and the 25 value-weighted Fama-French style portfolios in the UK. Sprecher and Pertl [1983]
document losses of 4% on the date a large loss is incurred by a firm. Capelle-Blancard and Laguna
[2010] find event companies suffer abnormal returns between -0.76% and -1.26% on average over
the two days following a chemical incident. The cumulative abnormal returns remain negative for
about six months and the losses are greater for firms with incidents that result in human harm
or environmental damage. Their study documents losses of $164 million for each casualty and $1
billion for a toxic/chemical discharge.
There is also some research that documents no or weak reaction to industrial incidents on
stock prices. Scholtens and Boersen [2011] find no significant reaction to 209 energy incidents that
occurred between 1973 and 2007 indicating that the market prices in the expectation of incidents
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and the stock price is discounted to reflect these expectations. Interestingly, they find no significant
reaction even for incidents that result in above median costs. Similarly, Jones and Rubin [2001] do
not find significant results using 14 incidents in the oil and power sector between 1970 and 1992.
Another set of post-incident costs that companies may face are regulatory penalties and lawsuits
(Dasgupta et al. [2006]; Gupta and Goldar [2005]). Several studies show a drop in stock value for
companies that fail to comply with regulations in the areas of product safety , workplace safety
(Fry and Lee 1989), and environmental regulations (Muoghalu et al. [1990]). Laplante and Lanoie’s
theoretical model, developed using a sample of 47 events involving Canadian firms, between 1982
to 1991, document no significant reaction at the announcement of lawsuits (Laplante and Lanoie
[1994]). This is at odds with evidence from the US that shows a strong negative reaction for US
firms on the day of lawsuit filing. This may be due to softer enforcement of regulations in Canada
along with a longer resolution time and lower fines relative to the US. While Muoghalu et al. [1990]
find no significant reaction on the date of settlement for US data, Laplante and Lanoie [1994] do
find a negative reaction at settlement of the lawsuit, though they posit whether a loss of 1.65-2%
is large enough to act as a deterrent in the future.
Rao and Hamilton [1996] finds a drop in shareholder value when reports on environmental
pollution are published in the Wall Street Journal and attributes this to the penalties imposed by
the market on a company behaving in an unethical manner. Jones and Rubin [2001] study the
previously documented large unexplained losses suffered by firms involved in negative incidents
which show that losses in equity value are greater than direct and estimated indirect costs of the
incident. These losses are attributed to the loss of reputation or in other words ‘goodwill’ (Dowdell
et al. [1992]). On the other hand, Karpoff et al. [2005] document that the loss in market value for
companies accused of environmental violations is due to legal penalties and not reputational loss.
Using a sample of 478 environmental violations, they find significant losses in the firms’ share values
with the average abnormal return of -1.69%. They then use a sub-sample of 148 firms, for whom
information on legal penalties, fines or damages awarded is available, to show that the losses in
shareholder value suffered by these companies is not significantly larger than the actual penalties,
fines or damages incurred, leading to their conclusion that discipline for environmental violations
is not due to reputational damage.
Finally, another body of research focuses on the contagion or the impact of an industrial incident
in one company on other companies in the same industry. Basse Mama and Bassen [2013] investigate
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the contagion effects of the Fukishima nuclear incident to uncover an abrupt increase in the systemic
risk of conventional electric utilities immediately following the event. Similarly, Ho et al. [2013]
investigate the effects of airline crashes on equity market contagion. They propose that the direction
of the impact of aviation disasters on the stock price of the crash airline’s rivals (competitors)
depends on the interaction of the ‘contagion’ effect and the ‘switch’ effect; incident at one firm
may provide, on the one hand, opportunities for its competitors but it may also results in losses
for competitors if the incident is likely to lead to increased regulatory and future health and safety
costs.
3. Data
This paper builds on the studies reviewed above, as well as the larger literature exploring
industrial incidents and equity market performance. A Generalised Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model is used to investigate specific equity market shocks across a
cohort of industrial incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013. Daily equity market
return data were used representing the time period both one year before and one year after an
industrial incident. The GARCH volatility estimate provided information about the ‘shock’ offering
substantial evidence of investor perceptions about the incident.
We focus on the financial performance and investor perceptions of the events though a thorough
analysis of share price volatility of the identified companies, along with a thorough analysis of the
contagion effects of such volatility as sourced from the selected corporate account data is taken
from Bloomberg. Stock price data is taken from Thomson Reuters Eikon. We utilise standard news
selection rules based on the source of the data. We develop on a combined search of Bloomberg
and Thomson Reuters Eikon, search for the keywords relating to industrial incidents for the period
1997 through 2014. For additional robustness of our developed dataset, we leverage upon that
of the analysis of all industrial incidents from the United States CSB (Chemical Safety Board)
database with an accompanying broader search of the LexusNexus database using a variety of
keywords. To obtain a viable observation, a single observation must be present across each of the
selected search engines and the source was denoted as an international news agency, a mainstream
domestic news agency or the company making the announcement itself. This method identified 179
individual incidents involving substantial property damage, injury and/or death involving publicly
traded companies. The number of incidents would have been considerably greater if not limited
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to those occurring in publicly traded companies. Data limitations, such as incomplete data and
substantial market illiquidity, reduced this sample to seventy-seven incidents from which the results
were obtained. Forums, social media and bespoke news websites were omitted from the search.
Finally, the selected observation is based solely on the confirmed news announcements being made
on the same day across all of the selected sources. If a confirmed article or news release had a varying
date of release, it was omitted due to this associated ambiguity. All observations found to be made
on either a Saturday or Sunday are denoted as active on the following Monday morning. All times
are adjusted to GMT, with the official end-of-day closing price treated as the listed observation for
each comparable company when analysing associated contagion effects.
The two year period around each of the industrial incidents was chosen as the best investigation
period, one year before and one year after. This was selected to minimise the effects of non-incident
coordinated events on the results of the GARCH methodology. Proxies then had to be selected
to quantify the effects of the numerous international crises that occurred during the investigated
horizon. These crises include the dot com collapse, the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the subprime
collapse of 2007 and the European sovereign debt crisis that ensued from 2008 onward. Numerous
variables were included such as United States dollar weighted exchange rate proxy, oil and gold
prices. The S&P500 Index and the VIX were found to be the variables that increased confidence
in the GARCH methodology, while mitigating non-industrial incident effects on the results. The
CBOE Volatility Index, also known by its ticker symbol VIX, is a popular measure of the stock
market’s expectation of volatility implied by S&P 500 index options, calculated and published by
the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). It is colloquially referred to as the fear index or
the fear gauge. The S&P 500 is a stock market index based on the market capitalisation’s of
500 large companies listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. It represents current, perceived financial
conditions within the United States. The VIX is a popular measure of option implied volatility of
the S&P500 options and is often referred to as the ‘fear gauge’. It represents a forward looking
estimation of stock market volatility over the next thirty days and offers a valuable variable towards
the GARCH methodology to identify current market conditions at the time of our investigated
industrial incidents.
7
4. Equity Market Valuation of Industrial Incidents
The basic empirical strategy is to use the GARCH (1,1) to obtain volatility changes in the
immediate aftermath of an industrial incident involving a publicly traded company in the United
States. These results are then used to estimate the perceived depth of each incident as observed
through equity market reaction. Based on the identified cause of the incident from that of the
CSB final incident reports, the selected incidents are sub-divided into groups, denoted as company
violations/safety errors, equipment failure, human error and vandalism. Equity market reaction
can then be regressed upon the number of injuries and fatalities based on each incident to obtain
the estimated cost to the company as observed through a reduction in market capitalisation after
the incident.
The GARCH specification was developed by Bollerslev [1986] and was designed to include lagged
conditional variance terms as autoregressive terms. The general GARCH (p,q) model has the
following form:
Rt = a+ b′Xt + εt, (1)
εt|Ωt ∼ iidN(0, ht) (2)







which says that the value of the variance scaling parameter ht now depends both on the past
value of the shocks, which are captured by the lagged square residual terms, and on past values of
itself, which are captured by the lagged ht terms. Specification tests found that the GARCH (1,1)
model served as the best fitting to estimate volatility effects after industrial incidents for publicly
traded companies.
It is also necessary to mitigate the effects of the widespread international financial crises that
took place after 2007. To do so, we include signalling variables in the mean equation (1), to
incorporate the effects on financial markets of external volatility, that is, volatility not relating
specifically to the particular industrial incident that we are observing. The VIX and the S&P500
were found to have the most informational benefit when added to the model and are incorporated
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throughout all the regressions undertaken. To specifically investigate volatility changes on the
days around the incident, dummy variables are incorporated into the volatility equation (3) of
the model. The dummy variables obtain a value of zero on the days before the incident and one
thereafter. Dummy variables used in this manner have a tendency to provide non-sensical results
when outweighed by days not needing a dummy value. The lagged equity returns for one, two and
three days before the incident were also found to provide explanatory significance and are therefore
included in the mean equation. The GARCH (1,1) methodology used in this study has the following
form:
Rt = a0 + b1Rt−1 + b2Rt−2 + b3Rt−3 + b4V IXt + b5S&Pt + εt (4)
εt|Ωt ∼ iidN(0, ht) (5)
ht = ω + α1ht−1 + β1u
2
t−1 + dt (6)
Rt−n represents the lagged value of returns, n days before Rt is observed. b4V IXt represents the
value of the VIX on the day the estimate Rt was observed and b5S&Pt the S&P500. These values are
included to mitigate international crises and non-equity specific market effects. dt is included in the
variance equation (4) to provide a coefficient relating to the included dummy variables. Bollerslev
[1986] showed that restrictions on the parameters for positivity, ω > 0, α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0, and the
wide-sense stationarity condition, α+ β < 1. Nelson [1990] proved that the GARCH (1,1) process
is uniquely stationary if E[log(β+αε2t )] < 0, where Bougerol and Picard [1992a] and Bougerol and
Picard [1992b] generalise this for any GARCH (p,q) order model. Bollerslev [1986] also proved that
if the fourth order moment exists, then the model can handle leptokurtosis.
The dummy variables dt, adapt to the daily changes in volatility, thus providing a daily estimate
of volatility. It would be expected that the volatility shock would be positive and the scale would
represent the perceived risk to the company’s long term survival as witnessed by investors. The
GARCH models were re-estimated daily for five trading days (one week) before the incident until
twenty trading days after (four weeks). This presents evidence as to when the shock died or when
the market returned to a level of volatility similar to those experienced in the period directly before
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the shock. The shocks can be segregated by incident to identify key driving forces, particularly,
which types of incidents lead to the largest shocks to equity market volatility.
5. Results
Each individual incident involves approximately five hundred and twenty four observations,
and the GARCH (1,1) model is regressed with the value of the dummy variables changing for
each individual day around the incident. Tables 1, 2 & 3 list the individual incidents included in
this study, sub-divided based on the designated causation factor attributed to each incident by the
United States CSB. Table 1 represents the cases attributed to company violations and safety errors,
including the source of the incident data, the company name and equity market ticker, the date
of the incident, the location, the type of incident and the number of injuries and fatalities. In 24
included incidents, there were 337 injuries and 68 fatalities, stemming from disasters including fires,
explosions, chemical leaks and spills, asphyxiation and toxic releases. To be included in this sub-set,
there was substantial evidence, through regulatory and legal investigation, specifically blaming the
parent company for operational failings that related directly to the cause of the incident.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here
Table 2 represents 25 industrial incidents that were attributed directly to equipment failure.
14,132 people were injured and 7 people died as a result of these incidents. Again, regulatory reports
directly linking the causation factor of the incident to faulty equipment were included, ranging from
faulty regulators and thermostats to broken seals and valves. Table 3 combines incidents that were
attributed directly to human error and vandalism. There were 28 specific incidents, in which there
were 86 injuries and 19 fatalities. The 3 cases identified as vandalism were investigated both from
a regulatory and criminal law stance. Overall, there were 77 separate incidents, from which the
GARCH(1,1) analysis could obtain results.
Insert Table 3 about here
The GARCH(1,1) analysis was sub-divided for each company based on the nature and causation
factor of the incident. Each model was regressed to obtain a rolling ten day estimate of equity price
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volatility at the time of the incident, ranging from volatility the day before, volatility the day after
and then daily volatility for the next four weeks. Table 4 includes the GARCH(1,1) results for the
companies included in the sample with causation attributed to company failings. The volatility
estimate for the twenty trading days after the incident is also included. Table 5 presents the
specific day-to-day volatility change for two weeks after the incident. The Z(t) and ρ(t) estimates
relate directly to the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron tests, which included an
intercept and a deterministic trend to capture the change in average volatility that took place in the
period after the industrial incident. The ADF model tests whether the equity series contained a unit
root in order to correct for serial correlation. The Phillip-Perron model employs a non-parametric
estimator of the variance-covariance matrix with d truncation lags. The models test down by
sequentially removing the last lag until a significant lag is reached giving the order of augmentation
for the ADF test that minimised the Akaike information criterion. The results indicated rejection
of the null-unit root hypotheses at the minimum of the one per cent level of significance.
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here
The high significance levels attached to the coefficients of the GARCH(1,1) models found in table
4 offers substantial support towards the use of the models in this study. The VIX and S&P500
are used to mitigate the effects of the international financial crisis that occurred during the sample
time horizon as the investigated sample. The α1 and β1 estimates of the GARCH models do not
accumulate to more than one, with this non-explosive behaviour adding further support to the
choice of the methodology. When investigating the data presented in table 5, it is important to
note that day 0 refers to the day on which the industrial incident occurred. However, some of
the incidents occurred after market close on day 0, therefore the true effect of the market reaction
is not visible until day 1 (one day after). The average GARCH volatility estimate for the day
before any incident is 0.0048, where only five incidents showed a reduced volatility level on day
0, but all estimates showed a dramatic increase on either day 0 or day 1. This presents evidence
that equity markets responded as expected to the industrial incident, where volatility increased
substantially. The two most serious incidents in this sub-sample include the BP explosion in 2005,
which caused 180 injuries and 15 fatalities and the Imperial Sugar explosion in 2008 which caused
42 injuries and 14 fatalities (incident 6 (BP) and 11 (IPSU) respectively above). Both incidents
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created significant increases in trading volatility between day -1, day 0 and day 1, with BP’s equity
volatility increasing from 0.0041 to 0.0257 on day 0 and 0.1801 on day 1. This dramatic increase in
volatility represents the increased perceived risk associated with the equity by investors at this time.
Volatility fell significantly in the following days after the incident as investor panic and negative
perceptions relinquished. Imperial Sugar presented GARCH volatility of 0.002 on day 0, but this
increased substantially to 0.016 on day 1 and 0.014 on day 2. Again, estimates of the change in
volatility are negative on day 4 (4 days after the incident) presenting evidence that the effects of
these incidents on equity market volatility are a short term phenomenon.
Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here
Tables 6 and 7 present the results for the GARCH (1,1) specification models for companies which
experienced industrial incidents attributed to equipment failures. Tables 8 and 9 present results for
companies which incurred industrial incidents attributed to human error and vandalism. It is clear
that some of the GARCH-calculated volatility occurred on d0 as news of the incident disseminated.
The average GARCH volatility for the day before the incident, dt−1 is 0.0048. We can see the
strong market reactions in most cases when comparing volatility increases from day to day. There
is a high degree of confidence in the S&P500 variable included in the mean equation throughout,
indicating a successful inclusion as a mitigating proxy for international effects. Incidents relating to
all causation factors present significant volatility changes in the two days after an industrial incident.
This presents evidence that equity markets take a dim view of these incidents as represented in the
volatility and deterioration of the associated equity prices. Of most interest is the type of reaction.
Incidents related to equipment failure and human errors tend to persist, whereas incidents linked
with vandalism tend to return to normal volatility levels quite quickly. Vandalism cannot generally
be directly attributed to failings of company policy, perhaps at most, it can be blamed on lax
security.
But at the time of each incident, one overpowering fact remained, media attention could not
segregate a single causation factor, with equipment failure being the commonly reported cause.
Therefore, volatility linked to human error and equipment failure tend to persist for weeks after
the incident as an investigation into the main causation factor is carried out. Reports by agencies
such as the CSB can take up to three years to complete, but the announcement of an expected
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causation factor is sometimes enough to mitigate market fears of further litigation. The results vary
significantly, but one key finding is that equipment failure leads to sharper immediate increases in
equity market volatility with less persistence (sometimes less than one week) whereas human error
attributed volatility can persist for up to three weeks. The volatility of equity prices appears to be
correlated with market perceptions of the future compensation, legal and clean-up costs associated
with rectifying the damage of the incident.
Insert Table 8 about here
5.1. The economic cost of industrial incidents
The GARCH(1,1) estimates provide valuable evidence surrounding the market reaction and
investor perceptions of the incidents included in this study. Figure 1 presents a visual representation
of these estimates, sub-divided by the attributed causation factor - company violations and safety
errors, human error, equipment failure and vandalism. These estimates are further divided based on
the size of the company being investigated. Companies falling under each category are segregated,
with companies possessing net market capitalisation of less than $10 billion denoted as small.
Insert Table 9 about here
Figure 1 helps to portray the equity market impact in the periods thirty days before and after a
chemical incident in a large company. Figure 2 presents the 20 day GARCH(1,1) volatility estimates
representing the average stock market volatility impact. Segregating the results between large and
small companies offer some interesting results. Primarily, we can see how there is very little equity
market punishment apportioned to small companies that suffer chemical incidents attributed to
human error and vandalism. In this situation, both events may be attributed to external factors
that the company may not be able to directly influence, therefore there is little punishment. Al-
ternatively, company violations and equipment failure experience substantial reductions in market
capitalisation, and given the relative lower level of smaller companies, this can become a significant
issue in terms of long term aspirations of company survival. Larger companies portray slightly
different dynamics in terms of equity market punishment. Vandalism tends to cause some short
terms market capitalisation decreases, but the effects tend to die out after 15-18 days. Equipment
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failure causes short term volatility in market capitalisation, but this volatility tends to mitigate
quickly in the periods 5-10 days after the event.
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here
Chemical incidents attributed to human error experience a substantial shock on day T, but also
experience an immediate rebound the day after the event. The most interesting finding relates to
company violations for large companies. In this situation, there is a dramatic decrease in market
capitalisation on day T which sustains throughout the 30 day period after the chemical incident.
This portrays valid evidence that equity markets effectively punish companies that do not adhere
or indeed enable a lapse in health and safety standards.
Company violation and safety errors would be perceived to be the most reputational and finan-
cially damaging causation factor associated with these incidents, with a large increase in GARCH
estimated volatility (increasing to 0.02 one day after the incident on average) and persisting for nine
trading days after the incident. This carries additional reputation cost, including public percep-
tions and of course employee distrust, but the results indicate that equity markets calm significantly
shortly after the incident. Incidents caused by vandalism carry the sharpest equity market response,
but tend to die out almost immediately. There appears to be a sharp investor reaction, potentially
attributed to the behaviour of ‘noise traders’, in equity markets. The GARCH estimated volatility
tends to decrease by 0.01 one day after the incident and returns to normal levels between eight and
nine days after the incident.
Incidents relating to human error are associated with a volatility increase of 0.015, but this
tends to reduce to negative levels between two and five days after the incident. But the volatility
tends to stay negative (reduced) for almost eighteen to twenty trading days (four weeks) after
the incident. Equipment failure leading to an industrial incident is found to cause significant
volatility increases and persist for almost three weeks after the event. These particular findings
can be attributed to investor uncertainty about the specific cause of the incident, as the identifying
cause may not be made public for a significant period, with investor knowledge being based on
media coverage (which may be speculative) and personal perceptions based on the incident. These
GARCH results present evidence of the turmoil and stress that can affect a traded company, even
after an industrial incident which would have caused significant suffering already. The increased
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volatility, though financially unquantifiable in the accounting sense, provides an additional cost to
the company through a reduction in market capitalisation resulting from falling equity prices. This,
combined with equity market dysfunction in the short term, may have direct negative impacts on
the future finance-raising ability of the company, in a period where they may need it most. Longer
term, this may impact on the survival prospects of the company itself.
The final part of this study involves quantifying an estimate of the cost per incident. As
explained in section 3 above, we can regress the market capitalisation loss (based on the estimated
market capitalisation and the immediate share price loss for five days after the incident) against
the type of incident, the number of injuries and the number of fatalities. Table 10 provides the
regression results.
Insert Table 10 about here
In all the investigated cases, each injury stemming from an industrial incident is found to cost
the company $14 million in stock market decreases (as measured by the fall in market capitali-
sation). There are minor differences between incident types, but this is a significant amount of
money. For example, the Chevron fire in Richmond in 2012 led to 14,003 official injuries as the
immediate population were poisoned with toxic fumes directly caused by the incident. The fire
was attributed directly to equipment failure. In the initial aftermath its share price fell nearly 9%,
wiping approximately $21.31 billion off its market capitalisation value. The model presented in
table 10 estimates a loss of $21.38 billion, but of this cost $196 million is directly attributed to
these injuries.
For a case involving company violations, the average equity market fall leads to a $720 million
reduction in market capitalisation for each fatality. This significantly dwarfs the $14 million estimate
associated with an injury and presents evidence that equity markets take these events very seriously.
For a publicly traded company, deaths relating to equipment failure are found to cost the company
$606 million each, with human error slightly lower at $545 million and death relating to vandalism
$465 million. It appears as though equity markets place a significant cost on fatalities directly
associated with company violations, with significant, but reduced, cost allocated to events that
may not be directly the fault of the company. This point alone reinforces the role of equity markets
as enforcers of environmental regulation. It must also be noted, that companies with lower market
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capitalisation and cash reserves are at significant risk of default in the event of a serious industrial
incident.
6. Conclusions
In an efficient market, discipline is imposed on companies by the shareholders adjusting the
price they are willing to pay for shares as new information is revealed. Information about industrial
incidents will be expected to lower share value due to possible costs, both certain (clean-up, lost
business due to interruption in production, regulatory fines and penalties) as well as potential (lost
future business, lawsuits, and additional future regulatory burdens). Part of these costs are going
to be ’expected’ and factored into the price even before the incident so the adjustment should reflect
the unexpected costs - as a result, incidents with higher cost implications should have larger adverse
stock price reactions.
This study of 77 industrial incidents involving publicly traded companies in the US show a loss in
shareholder value as well as increase volatility after industrial incidents. Results also indicate that
the identified cause of the incident is associated with important differences in stock market reactions.
Using a GARCH methodology, this paper shows a sharp increase in volatility immediately after
the incident. The volatility decreases most immediately for incidents where the cause is identified
as vandalism while the higher volatility tends to persist for companies that experienced incidents
where the cause is identified as equipment failure or human error. This is consistent with a market
factoring in the liability that may be attributed to the incident company itself. Results also vary
by firm size - small firms tend not to have adverse stock market reaction to incidents caused by
human error and vandalism while incidents brought about by company violations and equipment
failure generate a more adverse reaction. Large firms, on the other hand, recover more quickly from
incidents caused by equipment failure and this may be related to greater financial slack in larger
companies.
These results have implications for risk management strategies of companies in the chemical
sector. While external threats (for example, vandalism) also matter, risk management strategies
need to pay special attention to internal threats that may be mitigated by investment in health and
safety training programmes, comprehensive maintenance routines, regular testing of equipment and
ensuring that the company is compliant with regulatory requirements. Not doing so will expose
organisations to an increased risk of exposure to high costs in the event of an incident. This study
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provides estimates of these costs and can serve as counter-argument to costs of the risk management
strategies mentioned above.
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Figure 1: The impact of chemical incidents on estimated market capitalisation (US$)
Note: The above figures represent the estimated reaction of average market capitalisation rates in the
period after a chemical incident. The figures are segregated to identify key differences between large and
small companies, simply denoted as above and below $10 billion market capitalisation. The grey line
represents the five day moving average of market capitalisation (US$ billions). The sample represents the
thirty days before the chemical incident, denoted as day T, and thirty days after the incident. The
samples are segregated to represent incidents attributed to company violations, human error, equipment
failure and vandalism. From top to bottom, the above figure represents company violations, human error,
equipment failure and vandalism respectively. The left hand graphs represents the results for the average
large company, whereas the right hand graphs represents the results for the average small company.
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Figure 2: 20 day GARCH(1,1) volatility estimates representing the average equity market ‘shock’
Note: The shaded area above represents the trading days in which the included industrial incidents
occurred. The GARCH(1,1) methodology was repeated to obtain daily volatility changes in the equity
prices of the total sample.
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Table 1: Stock market tickers for companies (ranked by market capitalisation) in the same sector as those who experienced an industrial
accident.
Regression Data Source Company Ticker Disaster Type Date Location Injuries Fatalities
1 LN Diaz Chemical Corp SQM Chemical Explosion 05/01/2002 Holley 0 0
2 CSB First Chemical Corp 2121 Fire & Explosion 13/10/2002 Pascgoula 3 0
3 CSB West Pharmaceuticals WST Fire & Explosion 29/01/2003 Kinston 36 6
4 LN Able Energy ABLE Explosion 14/03/2003 New Jersey 16 0
5 CSB Sigma Aldrich SIAL Fire & Explosion 21/09/2003 Miami 1 0
6 CSB BP BP Fire & Explosion 23/03/2005 Texas City 180 15
7 RTN Tyson Foods TSN Chemical Leak 31/10/2006 South Hutchinson 1 2
8 CSB Valero Refinery VLO Fire & Explosion 16/02/2007 Sunray 4 0
9 CSB Xcel Energy XEL Asphyxiation 02/10/2007 Georgetown 3 5
10 LN BP BP Chemical Explosion 14/01/2008 Houston 0 1
11 CSB Imperial Sugar Co. IPSU Fire & Explosion 07/02/2008 Port Wentworth 42 14
12 CSB Packaging Corp of America PKG Fire & Explosion 29/07/2008 Tomahawk 1 3
13 RTN Delek Refining DEDR.L Fire & Explosion 20/11/2008 Tyler 3 2
14 CSB Veolia Environnement VE Chemical Leak 04/05/2009 West Carrollton 2 0
15 CSB ConAgra Natural Gas CAG Chemical Explosion 09/06/2009 Garner 25 4
16 RTN CF Industries CF Chemical Exposure 16/11/2009 Rosemount 0 2
17 LN Conmed Linvatech CNMD Chemical Explosion 03/12/2009 Anaheim 0 0
18 CSB E. I. DuPont De Nemours Co DD Chemical Leak 23/01/2010 Belle 0 1
19 RTN Tesoro TSO Fire & Explosion 02/04/2010 Anacortes 0 7
20 LN BP BP Chemical Spill/Release 20/04/2010 Texas 2 0
21 LN Du Pont DD Chemical Leak 09/11/2010 Tonawanda 0 0
22 CSB Donaldson Enterprises DCI Fire & Explosion 08/04/2011 Waikele 1 5
23 LN SM energy SM Chemical Leak 07/03/2012 Bismark 0 0
24 LN Arens Controls CW Chemical Explosion 22/05/2012 Arlington 17 1
Note: The above table presents a list of industrial accidents attributed to company violations and safety errors. Company violations and safety
errors in this case were identified in thorough investigations after the incident, where clear evidence of wrongdoing was identified and produced.
The data in this table was compiled after a thorough search of all available material on LexisNexis (LN) and The United States Chemical Safety
Board (CSB) database. The ticker for each company is linked directly to the traded equity of the domicile country of the company in question.
The ticker represents the equity data used in the GARCH analysis.
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Table 2: Industrial incidents attributed to equipment failure.
Regression Data Source Company Ticker Disaster Type Date Location Injuries Fatalities
25 LN Chevron CVX Fire 04/10/2001 Bakersfield 1 0
26 CSB Honeywell HON Chemical Leak 20/07/2003 Baton Rouge 8 0
27 LN Frontier Oil FOSI Fire 19/01/2004 Houston 0 0
28 CSB Praxair PX Fire & Explosion 25/06/2005 St. Louis 0 0
29 CSB BP BP Fire & Explosion 28/07/2005 Texas City 1 0
30 LN Mapa Spontex JAH Chemical Explosion 14/09/2006 Columbia 1 0
31 LN CAI Inc CAP Chemical Explosion 24/11/2006 Danvers 0 0
32 LN Frontier Scientific TMO Chemical Explosion 30/03/2007 Logan 1 0
33 LN Pacific States Cast Iron BRK.A Explosion 17/02/2008 Springville 11 0
34 CSB Goodyear GT Fire & Explosion 11/06/2008 Houston 0 1
35 RTN Oxydental Chemical Group OXY Chemical leak 18/11/2008 Deer Park 15 0
36 CSB Silver Eagle EAGLU Fire & Explosion 12/01/2009 Woods Cross 2 0
37 RTN Praxair PX Fire & Explosion 08/12/2009 Port Arthur 0 0
38 RTN Dow Chemical Company DOW Chemical Explosion 10/03/2010 Freeport 1 0
39 RTN Seneca Food Corp SENEB Chemical Leak 24/05/2010 Montgomery 0 0
40 CSB Horsehead ZINC Fire & Explosion 22/07/2010 Monaca 0 2
41 RTN Dow Chemical Company DOW Chemical Explosion 26/01/2011 Freeport 2 0
42 RTN Dow Chemical Company DOW Chemical Explosion 29/06/2011 Freeport 3 0
43 LN Oasis Petroleum OAS Fire & Explosion 14/09/2011 North Dakota 2 2
44 RTN Dover Chemical Corp DHR Fire 14/11/2011 Dover 5 0
45 LN SM energy SM Fire 11/05/2012 Cheyenne 0 0
46 RTN Chevron CVX Fire 06/08/2012 Richmond 14003 0
47 LN Samson Resources Company SSN Fire & Explosion 29/08/2012 Casper 0 0
48 RTN Valero Refinery VLO Fire & Explosion 03/12/2012 Memphis 3 1
49 LN Westlake Vinyls WLK Chemical Explosion 13/06/2013 Geismar 73 1
Note: The above table presents a list of industrial accidents attributed to equipment failure. This definition applies strictly to the scenario
where a chemical disaster was directly attributed to a fault connected with equipment on the companyâĂŹs premises as identified after
the incident. The data in this table was compiled after a thorough search of all available material on LexisNexis (LN) and The United
States Chemical Safety Board (CSB) database. The ticker for each company is linked directly to the traded equity of the domicile country
of the company in question. The ticker represents the equity data used in the GARCH analysis.
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Table 3: Industrial incidents attributed to human error and vandalism.
Regression Data Source Company Ticker Disaster Type Date Location Injuries Fatalities
Human Error
50 CSB BP BP Fire 13/03/2001 Augusta 0 3
51 RTN Kraft Foods KRFT Chemical Leak 23/12/2001 Maddison 1 1
52 CSB Honeywell HON Chemical Leak 29/07/2003 Baton Rouge 0 1
53 CSB Honeywell HON Chemical Leak 13/08/2003 Baton Rouge 1 0
54 CSB Formosa Plastics 1301 Fire & Explosion 23/04/2004 Illiopolis 2 5
55 LN Plains Exploration PXP Fire 31/08/2004 Baldwin Hills 1 0
56 CSB Marcus Oil MCS Fire & Explosion 03/12/2004 Houston 6 0
57 CSB Acetylene Service Co. 4093 Fire & Explosion 25/01/2005 Perth Amboy 1 3
58 LN Union Pacific UNP Chemical Spill 06/03/2005 Salt Lake City 12 2
59 RTN Ralcorp RAH Explosion 19/07/2005 Louisville 0 0
60 CSB Formosa Plastics 1301 Fire & Explosion 06/10/2005 Point Comfort 16 0
61 RTN Delek Refining DEDR.L Fire 26/10/2005 Tyler 1 0
62 CSB Valero Refinery VLO Asphyxiation 05/11/2005 Delaware 0 2
63 RTN Nalco Holding NLC Chemical Leak 08/01/2007 Sugar Land 14 0
64 RTN Dover Chemical Corp DHR Fire 14/09/2007 Dover 1 0
65 RTN Dow Chemical Company DOW Chemical Spill 13/11/2007 Freeport 1 0
66 LN News Corp NWSA Chemical Leak 17/12/2007 New York 5 0
67 RTN Dow Chemical Company DOW Chemical Spill 11/04/2008 Freeport 1 0
68 LN Wasatch Laboratories WSHP Chemical Explosion 27/07/2009 Ogden 3 0
69 RTN Valero Refinery VLO Fire & Explosion 29/04/2010 Memphis 1 0
70 RTN Dow Chemical Company DOW Chemical Explosion 17/05/2010 Freeport 4 0
71 RTN Bonduelle BON Chemical Explosion 12/06/2010 Oakfield 1 0
72 RTN Dow Chemical Company DOW Chemical Explosion 13/09/2010 Freeport 3 0
73 RTN Valero Refinery VLO Fire & Explosion 06/03/2011 Norco 1 1
74 RTN Goodyear GT Fire & Explosion 11/06/2011 Houston 7 1
Vandalism
75 LN Sumco 3436 Fire 20/01/2002 Indianapolis 0 0
76 LN Federal Mogul FDML Fire & Explosion 30/12/2010 Blacksburg 3 0
77 LN Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation COG Chemical Spill 20/08/2012 Susquehanna 0 0
Note: The above table presents a list of industrial accidents attributed to either human error or vandalism. These definitions apply strictly to the
scenario where a chemical disaster was directly attributed to an act of human error or indeed a case of vandalism with clear evidence provided
as identified after the incident. The data in this table was compiled after a thorough search of all available material on LexisNexis (LN) and
The United States Chemical Safety Board (CSB) database. The ticker for each company is linked directly to the traded equity of the domicile
country of the company in question. The ticker represents the equity data used in the GARCH analysis.
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Table 4: GARCH(1,1) model estimates for industrial incidents attributed to company failings and safety errors.
Ticker α0 Rt−1 Rt−2 Rt−3 V IX1 S&P1 α1 β1 d20 Z(t)∗ ρ(t)∗∗
1. SQM 0.0003 0.0906** -0.1046** 0.0844** -0.0332* 0.2454** 0.0660*** 0.8864*** 0.0005* 21.502*** 491.496***
2. 2121 0.0003 0.0810* -0.0335 -0.0034 -0.0086 0.1607 0.0696*** 0.8689*** -0.0026** 21.17*** 498.749***
3. WST 0.0005 0.0600 0.1120** 0.1272** -0.0266 0.2540*** 0.2824*** 0.5253*** 0.0016 19.482*** 451.692***
4. ABLE 0.0026 -0.1701*** -0.0524 -0.1475*** -0.1622*** -0.5526*** 0.0618*** 0.7346*** -0.0065** 26.956*** 545.667***
5. SIAL 0.0001*** -0.0264 -0.1315*** 0.0066 -0.0043 0.9692*** 0.1347*** 0.7368*** -0.0012* 23.119*** 477.3***
6. BP 0.0007* 0.0715** -0.0619* 0.0218 -0.0901*** - 0.0427*** 0.6728*** -0.0013** 21.772*** 467.882***
7. TSN 0.0013** 0.1458*** -0.0270 0.0064 -0.0155 0.5932*** 0.0407*** 0.7860*** 0.0023*** 20.395*** 439.589***
8. VLO 0.0007* 0.1135** -0.0683 0.0163 -0.0216 0.9897*** 0.0677*** 0.8814*** 0.0058** 19.063*** 384.58***
9. XEL 0.0005 -0.0942** -0.0771** -0.0324 -0.0243*** 0.6148*** 0.1122*** 0.8135*** 0.0029*** 23.875*** 477.248***
10. BP 0.0002 0.0904*** -0.0221 0.0172 0.0013 0.8954*** 0.0764*** 0.9222*** -0.0012*** 22.185*** 464.852***
11. IPSU 0.0028*** -0.2219*** 0.0232** 0.1850*** 0.0912*** 0.8995*** 0.2322*** 0.5334*** 0.0002 20.199*** 459.075***
12. PKG 0.0010 0.0205 -0.0798** -0.0003 0.8616*** 0.4393*** 0.2584*** 0.2582*** -0.0003*** 22.869*** 471.384***
13. DEDR 0.0003 -0.0397 0.0123 0.0366 0.0201*** 0.7429*** 0.3185*** 0.6746*** 0.0001* 25.796*** 558.875***
14. VE 0.0003 0.1187*** 0.0607* 0.0314 -0.0459** 1.0015*** 0.3002*** 0.6947*** 0.0026 20.6*** 446.302***
15. CAG 0.0002 0.0581 0.0179 0.0316 -0.0417*** 0.2748*** 0.3987*** 0.5689*** -0.0023 22.305*** 501.48***
16. CF 0.0011 -0.0635** -0.0305 -0.0256 0.8858* 0.8858*** 0.0438*** 0.9287*** 0.0035*** 23.985*** 495.059***
17. CNMD 0.0008 0.0677* -0.0038 0.0111 -0.1393*** - 0.0109*** 0.9795*** 0.0003 21.29*** 466.784***
18. DD 0.0006 -0.0027 -0.0012 0.0186 0.0357*** 1.4534*** 0.2701*** 0.7154*** 0.0002 23.323*** 564.42***
19. TSO 0.0006* 0.0472 -0.0215 0.0352 -0.0084 1.3024*** 0.0530*** 0.4602*** 0.0010** 19.781*** 418.132***
20. BP 0.0002 0.0341 0.0888*** 0.0169 0.0171* 1.0842*** 0.1577*** 0.7938*** -0.0205*** 24.079*** 579.97***
21. DD 0.0005 0.0314 0.0140 -0.0106 -0.0051 1.1541*** 0.0263*** 0.0915*** -0.0006*** 23.351*** 555.247***
22. DCI 0.0004 -0.0353** -0.0353* -0.0762*** -0.0065 1.1719*** 0.2491*** 0.7154*** -0.0012* 25.076*** 582.332***
23. SM 0.0008 0.0286 0.0389 -0.0146 0.0082 1.6643*** 0.0135*** 0.6738*** -0.0061*** 19.888*** 403.269***
24. CW 0.0009* -0.0185 0.0438* -0.0381 -0.1433*** - 0.1095*** 0.8390*** -0.0022* 24.819*** 539.7***
Note: The above table presents the results of the GARCH(1,1) model (see equations (3) and (4)) estimating the volatility impacts on equity returns
of chemical incidents attributed to company failings and safety errors as initially described in table I. ***, ** and * denote the significance of the
GARCH(1,1) estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 5: 10 trading day GARCH(1,1) model estimates for industrial incidents attributed to company failings and safety errors.
Ticker d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10
1. SQM 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006***
2. 2121 -0.001*** 0.043*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.007***
3. WST 0.017 0.057*** 0.027** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.015*** 0.012** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011***
4. ABLE 0.034*** 0.006*** -0.009*** -0.013*** 0.011*** 0.004*** -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.014 -0.015*** -0.015***
5. SIAL 0.005*** 0.007 0.001 -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
6. BP 0.026*** 0.180*** 0.012*** 0.009*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
7. TSN 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004 0.003 0.004* 0.003 0.002* -0.001*** -0.002***
8. VLO 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.010*** 0.010** 0.009 0.009*** 0.010 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008***
9. XEL 0.001*** 0.000* -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
10. BP 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.010*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
11. IPSU 0.000 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000* -0.001*** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.005***
12. PKG 0.022*** 0.001** -0.001*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.003*** -0.003 -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.002***
13. DEDR 0.002 0.002*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001***
14. VE 0.016*** -0.002* -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
15. CAG 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.003 0.003*** 0.002***
16. CF 0.003 0.039*** 0.010*** 0.007*** -0.004 -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.004 -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.004***
17. CNMD 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001***
18. DD 0.005 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***
19. TSO 0.010*** 0.002* 0.011 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.008 0.006*** 0.004***
20. BP 0.008*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.020 0.01 0.021*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.019***
21. DD 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***
22. DCI 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008 0.006 0.006*** 0.006***
23. SM 0.006*** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003* 0.002 0.002*** 0.004***
24. CW 0.011* 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006***
Note: The above table presents evidence of the rolling dummy variable estimates of volatility used in the GARCH(1,1) analysis. In this
situation, the dummy variable represents the ten days after a chemical incident attributed to company failings and safety errors. Through
the use of this methodology, it is possible to present evidence of whether volatility increases or decreases occurred in the period directly
after the incident. ***, ** and * denote the significance of the GARCH(1,1) estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 6: GARCH(1,1) model estimates for industrial incidents attributed to equipment failure.
Ticker α0 Rt−1 Rt−2 Rt−3 V IX1 S&P1 α1 β1 d20 Z(t)∗ ρ(t)∗∗
25. CVX 0.0004 -0.0210 -0.0773** -0.0015 -0.0273** 0.3463*** 0.1061*** 0.8177*** -0.0036*** 22.611*** 482.713***
26. HON 0.0002 -0.0187 0.0539** 0.0389 -0.0065 1.2412*** 0.0548*** 0.9433*** 0.0009 25.708*** 621.39***
27. FOSI 0.0115** -0.2532 - - 0.1943* - 0.0246*** 0.9607*** -0.0071 28.217*** 612.826***
28. PX 0.0003 -0.0087 0.0107 -0.0007 -0.0317** 1.1075*** 0.0877*** 0.5216*** 0.0013*** 20.15*** 395.239***
29. BP 0.0006 0.0461* -0.0083 0.0487*** -0.0904*** - 0.0376*** 0.7923*** 0.0020*** 22.12*** 496.801***
30. JAH 0.0007 0.0477 - - 0.0208 1.4803*** 0.1805*** 0.8069*** 0.0039 18.263*** 379.719***
31. CAP 0.0020*** 0.0546* 0.0447 -0.0066** 0.1066*** 1.1617*** 0.0862*** 0.8972*** -0.0139*** 22.429*** 492.298***
32. TMO 0.0009** -0.0243 -0.0518 -0.0073 -0.0119 0.7587*** 0.1033*** 0.8014*** 0.0093*** 24.892*** 582.949***
33. BRK.A 0.0004 0.1062** 0.0273 -0.0269 -0.0235*** - 0.1579*** 0.8412*** -0.0026 18.11*** 393.877***
34. GT 0.0010 0.0470* 0.0001 0.0279 0.0269 1.8619*** 0.0967*** 0.8764*** -0.0015* 23.192*** 564.907***
35. OXY 0.0019* 0.0179 -0.0222 0.0200 -0.0217 1.2604*** 0.0613*** 0.9211*** 0.0055** 23.411*** 462.975***
36. EAGLU 0.0001*** -0.0264 -0.1315*** 0.0066 -0.0043 0.9692*** 0.1347*** 0.7368*** -0.0012* 23.119*** 477.3***
37. PX 0.0002 -0.0402* -0.0319 0.0025 0.0100 0.9880*** 0.0505*** 0.9344*** -0.0023* 22.064*** 471.691***
38. DOW 0.0005 0.0056 0.0051 0.0049 -0.0018 1.6892*** 0.0316*** 0.9638*** -0.0026 22.847*** 531.027***
39. SENEB 0.0000 -0.0700 - - -0.0492* -0.0881*** 0.0877*** 0.9014*** 0.0004 20.972*** 472.269***
40. ZINC 0.0009 -0.0150 0.0102 -0.0625** -0.0017 2.1852*** 0.0980*** 0.7741*** 0.0025 23.799*** 545.094***
41. DOW 0.0005 0.0496** 0.0059 -0.0259 0.0043 1.6070*** 0.1655*** 0.7815*** 0.0022* 22.891*** 535.741***
42. DOW 0.0001 0.0443** -0.0234 -0.0272 0.0039 1.6612*** 0.0991*** 0.9009*** -0.0006* 22.58*** 522.318***
43. OAS 0.0002 0.0433 -0.0120 -0.0917** 0.0232 1.9308*** 0.2479*** 0.6973*** 0.0005*** 18.837*** 386.131***
44. DHR 0.0002 -0.0339* -0.0370* 0.0232 0.0019 1.1541*** 0.1234*** 0.5266*** -0.0017*** 24.071*** 561.14***
45. SM 0.0009 0.0044* 0.0541*** 0.0281 -0.0002 1.6259*** 0.0130*** 0.9706*** -0.0094** 20.631*** 422.077***
46. CVX 0.0006** 0.0447* 0.0542** 0.0234 0.0027 1.0349*** 0.0554*** 0.8989*** 0.0008* 21.59*** 557.795***
47. SSN 0.0041* 0.0976* -0.0560 -0.1033*** -0.1524*** 0.4800*** 0.2156*** 0.5938*** -0.0020 17.937*** 364.482***
48. VLO 0.0006 -0.0284 - - - 1.1419*** 0.1656*** 0.8002*** 0.0006 20.055*** 440.076***
49. WLK 0.0014* 0.0097 -0.0324 -0.0520 -0.0198 1.5086*** 0.0412*** 0.7607*** -0.0033*** 19.467*** 371.823***
Note: The above table presents the results of the GARCH(1,1) model (see equations (3) and (4)) estimating the volatility impacts on equity re-
turns of chemical incidents attributed to equipment failure as initially described in table I. ***, ** and * denote the significance of the GARCH(1,1)
estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
27
Table 7: 10 trading day GARH(1,1) model estimates for industrial incidents attributed to equipment failure.
Ticker d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10
25. CVX 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.014 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.001***
26. HON 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002***
27. FOSI 0.052*** 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.025** 0.023* -0.009*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.029*** 0.031***
28. PX 0.001 0.002 0.003*** 0.000*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001* 0.000***
29. BP 0.004 0.001 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006***
30. JAH 0.009 0.002 0.000 -0.001* -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.000**
31. CAP 0.001*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.019* -0.019*** -0.001*
32. TMO 0.017*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.007** 0.006 0.005** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
33. BRK.A 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003 -0.003*** -0.005**
34. GT 0.011 0.013*** 0.003*** -0.004 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.007* 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***
35. OXY 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.005*** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.009* 0.005***
36. EAGLU 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.001*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001***
37. PX 0.005 -0.003 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.002 0.003** 0.003
38. DOW 0.013*** 0.004*** -0.001*** -0.002** -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.000***
39. SENEB 0.073*** 0.042*** 0.033*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.005*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003***
40. ZINC 0.006*** -0.025*** -0.013** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.002*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001**
41. DOW 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.003***
42. DOW 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.003* 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.000**
43. OAS 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.005 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.001***
44. DHR 0.009*** 0.003* 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.005*** 0.000***
45. SM 0.002 -0.004** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010 0.009** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.009***
46. CVX 0.004*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001***
47. SSN 0.025*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002 0.011***
48. VLO 0.005*** -0.001*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.004*** -0.001 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.002*** -0.002***
49. WLK 0.044*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.012* 0.013*** 0.010***
Note: The above table presents evidence of the rolling dummy variable estimates of volatility used in the GARCH(1,1) analysis. In this
situation, the dummy variable represents the ten days after a chemical incident attributed to company failure. Through the use of this
methodology, it is possible to present evidence of whether volatility increases or decreases occurred in the period directly after the incident.
***, ** and * denote the significance of the GARCH(1,1) estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 8: GARCH(1,1) model estimates for industrial incidents attributed to human error and vandalism.
Ticker α0 Rt−1 Rt−2 Rt−3 V IX1 S&P1 α1 β1 d20 Z(t)∗ ρ(t)∗∗
Human Error
50. BP 0.0003 -0.0293 -0.1103*** -0.0226 0.0012 0.3366*** 0.0735*** 0.8381*** 0.0002* 22.935*** 465.17***
51. KRFT 0.0002 -0.0672* -0.0020 -0.0274 0.0064 0.7972*** 0.2215*** 0.6544*** -0.0016 22.239*** 469.831***
52. HON 0.0005*** -0.0146 0.0581** 0.0417 0.0026 1.2645*** 0.0542*** 0.9375*** -0.0017*** 25.511*** 625.563***
53. HON 0.0003 0.0031 0.0512* 0.0497* -0.0022 1.2563*** 0.0800*** 0.9137*** -0.0024** 25.883*** 654.893***
54. 1031 0.0007 0.0705 -0.0722 -0.1101** 0.0067 0.1500*** 0.3007*** 0.5098*** -0.0103* 20.969*** 454.178***
55. PXP 0.0022** 0.0015 0.0237 0.0230 -0.0262 1.1790*** 0.0763*** 0.9052*** 0.0066*** 22.239*** 469.831***
56. MCS 0.0034*** -0.1580** -0.0693 0.0168 -0.1247*** - 0.3091*** 0.4203*** -0.0033 23.12*** 461.229***
57. 4093 0.0016*** -0.0498 -0.0110 0.0161 0.0496 0.2590*** 0.0209*** 0.7071*** 0.0068 23.329*** 570.251***
58. UNP 0.0002 0.0038 0.0220 -0.0424 0.0306** 1.0465*** 0.0471*** 0.1528*** 0.0059*** 18.99*** 382.998***
59. RAH 0.0020*** - - - - 0.8794*** 0.0120*** 0.7737*** 0.0071*** 23.588*** 462.722***
60. 1031 0.0009 -0.0839* -0.0516 -0.0187 -0.0107 0.2895*** 0.2958*** 0.4089*** -0.0034*** 22.621*** 539.827***
61. DEDR.L 0.0002 -0.1006** 0.0254 0.0136 0.0147** 0.6115*** 0.1662*** 0.8045*** 0.0012*** 26.76*** 597.568***
62. VLO 0.0030** 0.0961* -0.0050 -0.0368 -0.0527* 1.1986*** 0.0220*** 0.9062*** -0.0050** 18.202*** 366.595***
63. NLC 0.0001 -0.0801* 0.0047 0.0061 0.0142 0.8444*** 0.1258*** 0.8566*** 0.0054*** 22.296*** 477.39***
64. DHR 0.0005 -0.0327 -0.0386 0.0002 -0.0199* 0.7849*** 0.0657*** 0.6115*** 0.0011 24.623*** 567.444***
65. DOW 0.0002 0.0990*** -0.0595** 0.0378 -0.0058 1.0066*** 0.0763*** 0.8791*** 0.0017* 25.076*** 600.31***
66. NWSA 0.0009 -0.0150 0.0102 -0.0625** -0.0017 2.1852*** 0.0980*** 0.7741*** 0.0025* 23.799*** 545.094***
67. DOW 0.0002 0.0748*** -0.0083 0.0089 -0.0015 1.0864*** 0.0499*** 0.9275*** 0.0011*** 25.539*** 634.619***
68. WSHP 0.0164** -0.1565*** -0.0753* -0.0497 -0.1497 -0.2040*** 0.4883*** 0.2293*** -0.0411*** 22.485*** 439.831***
69. VLO 0.0012* 0.1448*** - - -0.1855*** - 0.0250*** 0.9072*** -0.0025* 20.037*** 406.749***
70. DOW 0.0004 -0.0059 0.0158 0.0045 0.0005 1.7344*** 0.1679*** 0.6259*** 0.0011*** 23.442*** 572.29***
71. BON 0.0006 0.0177 0.0651* -0.0147** 0.0425*** 0.0294*** 0.7751*** -0.0032*** 24.21*** 548.24***
72. DOW 0.0001 -0.0019 -0.0158 -0.0071 -0.0226 1.4885*** 0.1443*** 0.8052*** 0.0039** 24.472*** 574.387***
73. VLO 0.0003 0.0595* -0.0019 -0.0347 -0.0115 1.5412*** 0.1842*** 0.8055*** 0.0007 21.045*** 433.9***
74. GT 0.0003 0.0425 -0.0380 - -0.0227 1.6751*** 0.1727*** 0.8018*** 0.0018 21.236*** 495.836***
Vandalism
75. 3436 0.0015 -0.0360 -0.0655* -0.1028** 0.0202* 0.3122*** 0.0846*** 0.8873*** 0.0037* 21.139*** 409.966***
76. FDML 0.0019** 0.0618** 0.0037 0.0209 0.0115* 1.5870*** 0.1975*** 0.5770*** 0.0010* 22.715*** 547.951***
77. COG 0.0026** -0.0013 -0.0644* -0.0367 -0.1354*** - 0.0081*** 0.9904*** 0.0003* 22.732*** 473.029***
Note: The above table presents the results of the GARCH(1,1) model (see equations (3) and (4)) estimating the volatility impacts on equity returns of
chemical incidents attributed to human error and vandalism as initially described in table II. ***, ** and * denote the significance of the GARCH(1,1)
estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 9: 10 trading day GARCH(1,1) model estimates for industrial incidents attributed to human error and vandalism.
Ticker d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10
Human Error
50. BP 0.030*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.015*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.011** -0.008*** -0.005***
51. KRFT 0.000*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004***
52. HON 0.003*** 0.000* 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***
53. HON 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002 0.000*** 0.001***
54. 1031 0.035** 0.047*** -0.009*** -0.001*** -0.007*** -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.013***
55. PXP 0.004*** 0.000*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005***
56. MCS 0.022*** 0.010** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002***
57. 4093 0.024*** 0.114*** 0.012*** -0.012*** 0.007*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002 0.008*** 0.004***
58. UNP 0.000*** 0.014*** 0.012** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005* 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.015***
59. RAH 0.001** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.003*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010***
60. 1031 0.023*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
61. DEDR.L 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.002 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001***
62. VLO 0.020*** 0.006*** 0.020*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011***
63. NLC -0.004 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
64. DHR 0.010*** 0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002***
65. DOW 0.029*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
66. NWSA 0.063*** -0.025 -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.009* -0.002*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001***
67. DOW 0.007*** -0.006 -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001***
68. WSHP 0.120 0.014*** -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.128*** -0.125*** -0.120*** -0.105*** -0.106***
69. VLO 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.005 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.005***
70. DOW 0.018*** 0.000* -0.001*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.014** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.006***
71. BON 0.011*** 0.009*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
72. DOW 0.005*** -0.003 -0.003*** -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003***
73. VLO 0.015* 0.019*** 0.008*** 0.004*** -0.001* -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002* -0.001*** -0.001***
74. GT 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002***
Vandalism
75. 3436 0.036*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.003*** -0.004***
76. FDML 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.009***
77. COG 0.016** -0.008*** -0.004* -0.010*** -0.004** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.008***
Note: The above table presents evidence of the rolling dummy variable estimates of volatility used in the GARCH(1,1) analysis. In this situa-
tion, the dummy variable represents the ten days after a chemical incident attributed to human error and vandalism. Through the use of this
methodology, it is possible to present evidence of whether volatility increases or decreases occurred in the period directly after the incident. ***,
** and * denote the significance of the GARCH(1,1) estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 10: Estimated cost per event, injury and fatality (billions, US$)
Event type Constant Est cost per inj Est cost per fat. Cost per event R2 Prob > F
Co. Viol./Safety Err -6.710** -0.014*** -0.720* 2.970 0.5790 0.000
Equipment Failure -5.200* -0.014*** -0.606** -2.260 0.5784 0.000
Human Error -5.490* -0.014*** -0.545*** -1.540*** 0.5779 0.000
Vandalism -6.360** -0.014*** -0.465 6.870 0.5792 0.000
Note: The above table presents the results of a regression based on the market capitalisation of each of the firms that experienced a chemical disaster included
in this investigation. The market capitalisation level is regressed upon the number of injuries, the number of fatalities and the specific type of event. This
provides and estimated equity market cost (or perceived equity market cost) based on the event type. ***, ** and * denote the significance of the GARCH(1,1)
estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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